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Abstract 
The effect of imposing binding and non-binding quantity restrictions upon price convergence in 
posted-offer markets is discussed. Unlike in the price control experiments prices do not jump after 
the removal of quantity restrictions. Further, a surprising property of prices was observed in these 
experiments, prices converge from below the competitive equilibrium. This result contradicted the 
well established empirical regularity that price convergence is from above the competitive 
equilibrium in Posted-Offer markets. Thus, the asymmetric distribution of surplus, or the 
imposition of quotas themselves affected price convergence in the quota experiments. 
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Introduction 
 Despite the prevalent use of quota restrictions little experimental work exists on 
the effect on market performance of quotas.  In this paper I first elaborate on the 
different types of quota that can exist and how they are applied in the real world. This is 
then followed by the some experimental results. 
Quotas: 
  The effect of a particular quantity restriction depends on how it is applied. There 
are two ways to impose quantity restrictions. First, a quantity restriction can be imposed 
at the level of a firm such that the firm as a unit can only sell upto a maximum of the 
quantity allowed under the quota.  This has been known  to occur both in planned and 
market economies,  wine imports, production of hops, or peanuts in the U.S. economy 
are some examples of this kind. Quantity restrictions of this kind can be called firm-
specific quotas. The second kind of quota occurs when a quantity restriction is imposed 
on a group of firms in a market, or upon an importing/exporting country. For example, 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) that put an upper bound on the total amount of the 
good that can be sold by a group of firms from a country fall in this category. Given that 
that under such quotas the incentive to defect is very high (as is evidenced by the 
Marketing Agreements in the U.S. in the 1930´s) innovative ways have been devised so 
that they end up functioning like firm-specific quotas. For example, in the Marketing 
Agreements that are prevalent in the U.S. the quotas are assigned to co-operatives at the 
state level.  The co-operatives then assign quotas to the individual members on the basis 
of past history1.  In the end the effect is as if firm-specific quotas were being used. Thus, 
many of the quota applications end up being as the firm-specific kind. Further, firm-
specific quotas are of greater interest as they increase market power of incumbent firms. 
 
Quota Experiments 
 Plott (1983) was among the first ones to study quota restrictions. He studied the 
effect of (pollution) standards in the presence of externalities in a Double-Oral auction 
market. The maximum pollution that all the sellers could ‘produce’ in the market was 
fixed. Note, this kind of quota restriction would come under market quotas where the 
total quantity for a group of sellers is fixed. In his experiments Plott observed that the 
standards approach was not as efficient as using a tax policy for pollution but, was more 
efficient than using no policy at all. Using standards, prices showed little or no tendency 
to converge. 
 Kujal (1994) conducted experiments where he studied whether non-
binding/binding firm specific quantity controls affect market performance in the same 
way as do price ceilings. These experiments were important for the following reasons. 
Earlier experiments on price controls had shown consistent qualitative properties (see 
Isaac and Plott (1981), Smiths and Williams (1981) and Coursey and Smith (1983)). 
The removal of price ceilings resulted in prices jumping upwards after the removal of  
controls. Further, price controls have an impact on market performance even after their 
removal (see Isaac (1988) for a good discussion on remnants of regulation). Thus, as 
prices and quantities are sometimes used as alternative modes of regulation it is 
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 This is made possible because the federal government can regulate inter-state and not intra-state 
commerce. As a result the federal government regulates the inter-state flow while the co-operatives assign 
in state quotas. 
important to study whether the qualitative results carry over across the two different 
modes of regulatory control. 
 In his experiments Kujal (1994) found that after the removal of firm-specific 
quantity controls there was no evidence of discontinuous jump of prices (neither in the 
experiments with binding quotas, nor in the experiments with non-binding quotas). 
However, tests on aggregate data show that quotas do affect prices. Tests on individual 
experimental data were mixed. Further, a surprising property of prices was observed in 
these experiments. Prices converged from below the competitive2 equilibrium. This 
result contradicted the well established empirical regularity that price convergence is 
from above the competitive equilibrium in Posted-Offer markets. Thus, the asymmetric 
distribution of surplus, or the imposition of quotas themselves affected price 
convergence in the quota experiments. Further, given that the experimental design had 
market power price convergence for both the BQ and NBQ experiments was from below 
the non co-operative equilibrium. However, as the experiments progressed prices 
converged to the Nash Equilibrium. 
 Quota experiments also showed interesting behavioral characteristics. 
Efficiencies in the short run were lower than that observed in the price control 
experiments. This is important, because, if the effect on market efficiency is not the 
same in the short run then one needs to be careful in employing these two alternative 
modes of regulatory control3. From the experimental evidence it seems that, given the 
quotas, the sellers take some time to find the market price. However, under price 
controls it seems much easier to locate the profit maximizing quantity. The answer to 
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 The competitive equilibrium is defined as the price that gives 100% total surplus. 
3
 This is related to the question raised by Weitzman (1974) where he asks why quantities, and not prices, 
are the preferred modes of control for internal transfer of firms. 
this lies in the manner in which the two market controls affect seller search space. This 
is discussed later in the paper. 
 
 
 
Experimental Design 
 The experiments used the posted offer exchange mechanism4. There were three 
different experimental designs: (I) the baseline (with no quantity restrictions); (II) non-
binding quota experiments (the sum of seller capacities equals the total quantity sold at 
the competitive outcome) and; (III) binding quota experiments (the sum of the seller 
capacities is less than the competitive volume under the baseline design). In designs (II) 
and (III) the quotas were removed midway in period 10. 
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 Five experiments were run for each treatment.  Each experiment had four sellers 
and four buyers. Seller prices were arranged in ascending order with the seller with the 
lowest price selling first. The buyers were queued randomly to purchase the goods after 
the sellers post the prices. The next period would start after all the buyers had stopped 
purchasing the good. A buyer could purchase a unit of the good as long as the purchase 
price did not exceed the seller valuation of the good. As the focus of the paper was to 
study seller behavior due to the imposition of the quota buyers were simulated. The 
buyers revealed perfectly and accepted zero profit. 
 
 (I) Baseline (BSL) experiments (figure-1): 
This design was characterized by four sellers and four buyers each capable of buying 
and selling five units each. Assuming everyone prices at the competitive equilibrium the 
surplus was divided between the buyers and sellers symmetrically. 
 (II) Non-binding quotas (NBQ) (figure-1): 
In this design the sum of sellers total capacity equals thirteen. This leaves the 
competitive price and the quantity unchanged from the baseline experiments5.  
 (III) Binding quota experiments (BQ) (figure-1): 
The sum of sellers’ capacity equals eight. The competitive outcome is in a 5 cent range, 
15-20 cents above the CE in the NBQ/BSL design. Binding quotas distribute the total 
surplus in the favor of sellers. 
 The subjects receive a special announcement that quantity controls will be in 
effect when appropriate. If any seller attempts to violate the quota restriction this will 
result in the rejection of the sellers’ offer until the output constraint (quota) is satisfied. 
Subjects are also told that their capacity is determined by a central authority. This 
announcement is made to all the subjects. They are also given individual (private) 
announcements that state their capacities. The announcement at the start of the 
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 For details on the functioning of the posted offer institution see Ketcham, Smith and Williams (1984). 
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 The effect of such restrictions on price outcomes is discussed in detail later. 
experiment reads: “Your capacity is determined by a central authority. Your capacity is 
.... Please make sure that the number on the screen coincides with the capacity stated.” 
 One period prior to the removal of quotas the subjects are told about the 
forthcoming change in capacity. Subjects are told individually what their “new” 
capacities are. Everyone knew that individual capacities have been changed, however, 
individual capacity changes are private information. The announcement read as follows: 
“The central authority has now decided to change your capacities. You now have a 
capacity of FIVE units. Please make sure that the monitor screen shows the correct 
amount.” The purpose behind the announcement was to emulate an environment where 
a regulatory authority decides on individual capacities. 
Market equilibrium: 
 Before the discussion of the experimental results it will be in order to discuss the 
‘predicted’ market equilibrium (as the non-cooperative price is not the competitive 
price) in the experiments. The competitive equilibrium has been defined as the price that 
gives efficiency of 100% for the following reasons. The experimental design gives 
market power to the sellers. Looking at figure-1, and table-1, it is easy to see that if all 
the sellers charge a price of 30 sellers 2 and 3 can each gain by selling at a price 9 cents 
higher (1 cents less than the two high cost units of sellers 1 and 2). At this price 
configuration the two other sellers sell 3 units at 30 each. Now, sellers 1 and 2 can each 
charge 4 cents above the competitive equilibrium and sell all their units thereby getting 
higher profits. Thus, no seller charges a price of 30 as it is always profitable to deviate 
from this price for all the sellers. This implies that there does not exist a unique Nash 
equilibrium in prices due to the asymmetric allocation of the out of equilibrium units for 
the sellers. It is for this reason the competitive equilibrium is defined to be at 30, i.e. the 
price that maximizes total market surplus. Further, note that a similar analysis applies 
for the non-binding quota experiments. 
 Educated guesses on price can be made to show the approximate price equilibrium 
in the experiments. This is useful, as it gives us a price prediction for the experiments. It is 
seen that if a seller prices at 45 the minimum amount it sells is 2 units. The gain (30) 
dominates the loss on the unsold unit (15). Now assume that everyone prices at 45, 
however, at this price some sellers gain by lowering the price and selling 4 units. In fact all 
sellers gain by lowering their price and selling additional units. What is important is to 
determine till what price is each seller willing to lower its price such that the net gain from 
undercutting and selling more is positive. This can be done individually for all the sellers. 
Seller 4 only finds it profitable to undercut till 40 and not below. The maximum it gains 
from undercutting is 56, from pricing at 44 and selling 4. Now, sellers 2 and 3 can price at 
39, sell 4 units and gain 36 cents (which is greater than the 30 gained from selling 2 units). 
The only seller that will undercut them at this price is firm 1 that has the only available 
extra unit at 30.  Seller 4 will never undercut below 40 cents and sellers 2 and 3 never 
undercut below 37.5 cents (with a gain of 7.5 cents on each unit, selling 4, it makes them 
indifferent between pricing at 45 and pricing at 37.5). Now, all we need to do is to see if 
seller 1 wants to price below 37.5. At any price below 37.5, selling 4 units, seller 1 earns 
less (7×4=28) than the 30 cents it earns at a price of 45. Hence, we know that no seller 
prices below 38 cents (as prices in decimals are not admitted). This simple exercise gives 
us an idea that the approximate range of equilibrium prices lies in [38,45]. 
Table-1 
Marginal Cost and Marginal Valuations 
 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 
Buyer 1 60 55 45 20 20 
Buyer 2 55 50 45 25 15 
Buyer 3 55 50 45 25 15 
Buyer 4 60 55 45 30 20 
Seller 1 00 05 15 30 40 
Seller 2 05 10 15 35 45 
Seller 3 00 05 15 35 55 
Seller 4 05 10 15 40 50 
 
Experimental Results 
 Results are reported from five experiments each for the baseline, binding quotas 
and non-binding quotas. 
 In the non-binding quota and binding quota experiments two results are of 
interest. The number of contracts remains well below the competitive level of 12 and as 
a result efficiency levels are lower in the earlier periods (figure-2). After the non-
binding quotas are removed, output in the subsequent periods remains lower and slowly 
starts to converge to the competitive equilibrium. Similar results are also obtained for 
the binding quota experiments. Low output realization is reflected in low efficiency 
levels observed in the binding quota experiments (figure-2). This is reminiscent of what 
Isaac (1988) calls remnants of regulation and is also observed in the price control 
experiments (see, Coursey-Smith, Isaac-Plott, and Smith-Williams). 
 In the binding quota experiments the average contracted price converges from 
below the competitive equilibrium when the quotas are in effect (figure-3). This result 
contradicts the well established empirical regularity of Posted-Offer markets where the 
contract price converges from below the competitive equilibrium. However, if instead 
we use posted prices to study price convergence (Kujal, 1992) price convergence is 
observed from above the competitive equilibrium (figure-4). Moreover, as economic 
theory predicts posted prices it seems reasonable to use posted prices to study 
institutional characteristics. 
 Looking at efficiencies we see that experiments with binding quotas show a 
tendency towards lower surplus realization even after the quantity controls are removed. 
However, by the end of period fifteen efficiencies for the baseline, non-binding quota 
experiments and binding quota experiments converge. It is clear that quotas, both non-
binding and non-binding, clearly affect market performance after their removal. (This 
result is also reflected in all the price control experiments where a discontinuous jump 
in prices was witnessed after the removal of the price controls.) It is clear that market 
controls affect market performance even after their removal in our static framework.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 Quota experiments have shown two interesting results. First, as was also seen in 
the price control experiments, quantity controls, both non-binding and binding, tend to 
affect institutional performance even after their removal (as was also observed in the 
price control experiments). This lends support to the remnants of regulation hypothesis 
(Isaac, 1988). Second, with binding quotas average contract price convergence is 
observed from below the competitive equilibrium. This result goes against the observed 
empirical regularity of price convergence from above the competitive equilibrium in 
posted offer markets. 
 Further, no discontinuous jump in prices is observed after the quotas are 
removed as was observed in the price control experiments (both, posted offer and oral 
double auctions). Another interesting characteristic of the binding quota experiments is 
that sellers, surprisingly, have low efficiency levels on the average. This is observed 
inspite of the fact that the surplus distribution favors the sellers. It is evident that quotas, 
binding or non-binding, affect market performance while they are in place and after they 
have been removed. 
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Effect of quotas on price convergence: 
 
Three series of experiments were run using the Posted-Offer trading 
institution. Each experiment had four sellers and four (simulated) buyers. 
The buyers revealed perfectly and accepted contracts as long as they made 
non-negative profits. All experiments ran for 20 periods with the quota 
imposed for the first ten periods and then removed for the latter ten 
periods. All sellers were publicly informed that the quotas have now been 
removed. Each seller was assigned an individual quota and all seller 
capacities and valuations were private information. 
 
 In the control experiments, and the no-quota regime, each seller has 
a capacity of 5 units each. In the non-binding quota experiments three 
sellers have a capacity of 3 units each while, one seller has a capacity of 4. 
With the binding quota each seller could sell at most 2 units. 
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